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Presently, we cannot find the scientific analysis that clearly explains the deepest roots 
of global economical and moral crisis. Because of that many famous politicians, 
economists, sociologists denote the understanding of current situation as the most 
valuable  attainment.  Under  traditional  influence  of  the  doctrine  of  spontaneous 
harmony of egoistic individual behavior many economists believe that competition 
and private property rights through the markets' price mechanism leads in the long 
run to the Pareto efficiency equilibrium. At the same time the social and economic 
reality categorically asks to ascertain the market failure and to revision the classical 
statements of microeconomics. The perfect competition market has lost its attributes 
due  to  dialectics  of  interactions  of  agents.  The  investigation  of  the  interactions 
strategies  of  the  individuals  are  based  on  the  game  theory,  what  also  helps  to 
understand the role of asymmetric information as a specific market failure factor. In 
the present paper the Martin Shubik classical surviving game is analyzed and some 
statements of Herbert Gintis concerning this game are critically appraised. The 
solution of Martin Shubik game in the original geometrical form is offered. The 
problem  of  Martin  Shubik  "does  the  fittest  necessary  survive?"  is  transformed 
according  the  case  of  asymmetric  information  in  problem  "does  the  pretender 
survive?", for which the answer "if the agent is not the weakest, but he pretends to be 
the weakest, than this agent survives with high probability" is offered. The results of 
the present paper appear to be innovative, not discussed in literature available to the 
author of the present paper. 
 
Keywords: game, probability of surviving, interactions of the agent's strategies, Nash 
equilibrium, asymmetric information, pretension 
 
JEL Classification: C70, C73 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The view about wide diversity of game theory applications offers, for instance, the content of the 
Gintis’s  (2009,  p.390)  book:  "Game  Theory  Evolving:  A  Problem  Centered  Introduction  to  Modelling 
Strategic Interaction." 
The applications of game theory as tool for decision support is given in the books of Baye (1997, p. 
578), Байе (1999, p. 743), Binmore (2007, p. 184), Jaunzems (2008, p. 555; 2009a, p.311; 2009b, p. 360). In 
paper of Jaunzems (2009c) the analysis of some social economical processes in Latvia with help of game 
theory is presented. There is no lack of literature and sources, nevertheless in the practice of social and 
economic analysis in Latvia the game theory introduces too slowly. 
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In Gintis’s book (2009, p. 23) under the title "When Weakness Is Strength" the model "The surviving 
game of three agents" offered by game theorist Martin Shubik (1954, 43-46) is considered. With help of this 
model the surviving example which contradicts to the fundamental thesis of Charles Darvin "survival of the 
fittest" is constructed. In this example the highest probability to survive has the weakest player. However this 
example is too simplified. The deepest investigation of the problem discovers that probability of surviving 
depends on mutual proportion of agents' strength and from behavior of agents as well. Unfortunately the author 
of present paper was not able to get original paper of Martin Shubik (Shubik, 1954, pp. 43-46). Therefore the 
aim of present paper is dispute with Herbert Gintis (2009) and more wide interpretation of Charles Darvin 
thesis. The limitation of some statements of Herbert Gintis (2009) empirically is proved. In this paper exact 
definition of surviving game is given, the mathematical model of surviving game under definite comparatively 
universal  assumptions  is  constructed  and  with  help  of  model  multi-shaped  numerical  experiments  are 
performed. Besides that the Nash equilibrium of surviving game is identified, the classical surviving game is 
modified according asymmetric information and instead the theme "When Weakness Is Strength" the theme 
"When Pretension Is Strength" is discussed. The authors have never met the mentioned results in literature, 
therefore comments are welcomed and, if is not proved the opposite, results of the present paper have to be 
evaluated as innovative. 
 
2.  The Definition of the Surviving Game 
 
The definition of the surviving game comes next, with comments. 
Three individuals − Ansis, Basis, Casis take part in the surviving game. 
At  first the  sequence  of  shooting  during  lottery  is determined.  As  result  one  from  six  possible 
sequences (ABC), (ACB), (BAC), (BCA), (CAB), (CBA) is fixed. The probability of each sequence is 1:6. 
The game is extensive − in the each step or act of the game one of players has rights to shot. 
Explanation. Let us consider, for instance, the sequence (ABC). The sequence (ABC) means, that 
Ansis shot the first. Ansis has three strategies: Ansis may shot Basis, Ansis may shot Casis and Ansis may 
shot in the air. 
(1) Let us assume that Ansis shot Basis; we will denote that as A→B. If Ansis hits Basis than Basis 
exits the game (we will say Basis is shot down or Basis is eliminated) and farther sequence of shooting is (CA). 
If Ansis miss Basis then the farther sequence of shooting is (BCA). 
(2) Let us assume that Ansis shot Casis; we will denote that as A→C. If Ansis hits Casis than Casis 
exits the game, he is eliminated and farther sequence of shooting is (BA). If Ansis miss Casis then the farther 
sequence of shooting is (BCA). 
(3) Let us assume that Ansis shot in the air; we will denote that as A→O. The farther sequence of 
shooting is (BCA). 
The five another sequences are interpreted analogically. 
The definition of surviving game continued. Let us assume that the following probabilities are given. 
The probability that Ansis hits is pA. The probability that Ansis miss we denote as qA: pA + qA = 1. 
The probability that Basis hits is pB. The probability that Basis miss we denote as qB: pB + qB = 1. 
The probability that Casis hits is pC. The probability that Casis miss we denote as qC: pC + qC = 1. 
The each of agents is interested to stay alive. The game is finished when only one of the players has 
left alive. Let us observe that the surviving game may have infinite acts because of possibility that players miss 
and miss and all three agents or at least two of them have infinite chances of shooting. In the each act the agent, 
who has the move, chooses the strategy from set of three strategies, if three players are still alive, or only one 
strategy if two players are remain. 
Our main goal is the determination of the Nash equilibrium of this game. 
Let us illustrate the Nash equilibrium in the simple, but nevertheless a very pithy case. 
Suppose pA = 1, pB = 1, pC = 1 and the sequence (ABC) during lottery is determined. It is easy to see 
that the triple of strategies (A→O, B→O, C→O) determines a situation that is very stable Nash equilibrium. 
Indeed, if Ansis shot Basis, Basis is eliminated and the next moves Casis who shots down Ansis and wins. So, 
Ansis would be unwise if he shots Basis or Casis. The best strategy for Ansis is shot in the air. When the right 
of move has Basis he judges similarly and makes decision that shot in the air is the best strategy for him. The 
same decision makes Casis. So the eternal peace exists between these three antagonistic and strong warriours. 
The given surviving game associates with popular but wrong thesis about bipolar world as peace 
guarantee. If only two players Ansis and Basis take part in surviving game and pA = 1, pB = 1, than shooter 
who has rights to shot first unswerving eliminates the enemy. We recognize here the first move advantage 
often discussed by military experts. Jaunzems, A., 2014. Pretension Strategy in the Surviving Game. Expert Journal of Economics, 2(2), pp. 55-68 
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Conclusion. The antagonistic bipolar world is unstable. The antagonistic tripolar world is very stable. 
Important remark. Everywhere further, if especially is not formulated another assumption, we will 
examine comparatively universal case, namely, we will suppose that 0 < pC < pB < pA ≤ 1. We will say that 
Ansis is the strongest but Casis is the weakest shooter. 
What is the payoff of the player? The payoff of the player could be the surviving probability. However, 
if we are going to investigate this game analytically with help of mathematical methods we need correct agents' 
surviving probability definition, what unfortunately we do not meet in Gintis’s book (2009) published by 
Princeton University Press. 
Let us illustrate with help of simplest stochastic experiment − dice throw the theoretical difficulties 
what arise when we are going to definite agents' surviving probability. Try to understand the meaning of 
following question: "Is the probability that first will come in sight even number bigger than the probability 
that first will come in sight number one?" 
It is possible to calculate, for instance, probability of event "five times throwing the dice the even 
number will come in sight earlier than number one". In the same time the cardinality of the set of all outcomes 
when the first comes in sight even number is continuum. Also the cardinality of the set of all outcomes when 
the first comes number one is continuum.  
In order to depict the extensive process of the surviving game graphically as decision-state tree we 
have to use infinite graph with infinite volume of infinite sub-branches. 
 
2.1. Two Agents' Surviving Game 
Before investigation of three agents' surviving game is purposeful to start with two agents' surviving 
game analysis, what is sufficiently simpler because of each player has only one strategy − to shot enemy.  
For instance, let us examine the case when Casis is eliminated and further sequence is (AB). Such a 
game is possible to depict geometrically as decision-state tree with infinite volume of finite sub-branches and 
one infinite subbranche. 
We are going to define the probability that Ansis survives as sum of infinite geometric series.  Let us 
denote probability that Ansis has eliminated Basis after 2k+1 shoots or earlier with PA{(AB) | 2k+1}. Let the 
sign "+" means "hits", the sign "−" means "miss". 
Then, for instance, in the case 2k+1 = 5 the event we are interested in consists from the following 
results of shooting: (A+), (A−, B−, A+), (A−, B−, A−, B−, A+). 
We calculate PA{(AB) | 5} as follows: 
 
PA{(AB) | 5} = pA + qA qB pA + (qA qB )2 pA = pA [1+ qA qB + (qA qB )2]. 
 
It is easy to see by analogy that PA{(AB) | 2k+1} = pA [1+ qA qB + ... + (qA qB )k] . 
We calculate the limit of partial sum of the geometric series: 
 PA(AB) := 
  k lim PA{(AB) | 2k+1} = 
B A
A
q q 1
p

. 
Number PA(AB) will be interpreted as probability that Ansis survives. 
 
The probability PB(AB) is defined analogically: PB(AB) := 
  k lim PB{(AB) | 2k} = 
B A
B A
q q 1
p q

. 
As a check on our formulas, note that PA(AB) + PB(AB) = 1. 
 
Remark.  In  book  published  in  Princeton  University  (Gintis,  2009)  the  probability  PA(AB)  has 
calculated from the recursion equation: PA(AB) = pA + qA PA(BA) = pA + qA qB PA(AB).  
Solving, we get PA(AB) = 
B A
A
q q 1
p

. 
Let us mark that this method is heuristic but mathematically incorrect. 
In the analysis of three agents' surviving game we will make use of the following theorem about two 
agents' game what confirms the intuitive suspected connection: the weakest enemy of Ansis, the higher is for 
Ansis probability to survive. 
 
Theorem. PA(AB) < PA(AC) if and only if pB > pC. Jaunzems, A., 2014. Pretension Strategy in the Surviving Game. Expert Journal of Economics, 2(2), pp. 55-68 
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The proof follows from equalities PA(AB) = 
B A
A
q q 1
p

; PA(AC) = 
C A
A
q q 1
p

. 
Consequence. PA(BA) < PA(CA) if and only if pB > pC. 
 
 
2.2. The Nash Equilibrium of the Sub-Game of the Surviving Game and Nash Equilibrium of 
the Martin Shubik Game   
As it was showed before in general case of surviving game the cardinality of agents' strategies set is 
continuum. We are going to make important assumption about agents' behavior in three shooters game, which 
will relieve us the analysis of game and will allow us to get important and pithy interpreted conclusions. 
Let us suppose that each of agents chooses his strategy in the very beginning of the game and after 
that each time when agent has right to move, he acts according this strategy. It means, that Ansis in the very 
beginning of the game chooses one of three strategies A→B, A→C, A→O, and then utilizes this strategy each 
time when he has rights to move (naturally, till there are three players in the game). Analogically, Basis chooses 
one of strategies B→A, B→C, B→O and Casis chooses one of strategies C→A, C→B, C→O. 
Taking in account this assumption all together 3×3×3 = 27 triples of strategies exist. 
Concrete triple of strategies, for instance, (A→B; B→A; C→O) allows us to follow the extensive 
process of game so say in the probabilities tongue and analogically as it was did in the case of two players to 
define agents' surviving probabilities as sum of geometric series.   
Given sequence of acts (ABC) and given triple of strategies (A→B; B→A; C→O) determine three 
surviving probabilities: PA(ABC), PB(ABC) PC(ABC). 
The game what corresponds to the concrete sequence determined during lottery we will call as sub-
game of the surviving game. We have six sub-games all together, each of that corresponds to one of six possible 
shooting sequences (ABC), (ACB), ... , (CBA). 
The Martin Shubik game is completely defined, if we construct the (27×3)-table represented strategy-
surviving probabilities for all sub-games. Thus, in order to investigate Martin Shubik game we calculate 
6×27×3 = 486 probabilities. After that, taking in account that initial sequences are stochastic, we calculate the 
(27×3)-table  of  mathematical  expectations  of  strategy-surviving  probabilities.  These  table  allows  us  to 
determine Nash equilibrium of Martin Shubik game and to make different another conclusions. 
Let us utilize heiristic method of surviving probabilities determination from the recursion equations 
offered by Herbert Gintis. (The same results can be get as limits of geometric series.) Than, for instance, we 
will get the following expressions for Ansis, Basis and Casis surviving probabilities in the sub-game (ABC) 
concerning strategies triple N := (A→B; B→A; C→O): 
 
N
A P (ABC) = pA PA(CA) + qA 
N
A P (BCA) = pA PA(CA) + qA qB 
N
A P (CAB) = 
= pA PA(CA) + qA qB 
N
A P (ABC). Solving, we get 
N
A P (ABC) = 
B A
A A
q q 1
) CA ( P p

. 
 
N
B P (ABC) = qA 
N
B P (BCA) = qA [pB PB(CB) + qB 
N
B P (CAB)] = 
= qA pB PB(CB) + qA qB 
N
B P (ABC)]. Solving, we get 
N
B P (ABC) = 
B A
B B A
q q 1
) CB ( P p q

. 
 
N
C P (ABC) = pA PC(CA) + qA 
N
C P (BCA) = pA PC(CA) + qA [pB PC(CB) + qB 
N
C P (CAB)] = 
= pA PC(CA) + qA pB PC(CB) + qA qB 
N
C P (ABC). 
 
Solving, we get 
N
C P (ABC) = 
B A
C B A C A
q q 1
) CB ( P p q ) CA ( P p


. 
 
As a check on our formulas, note that 
N
A P (ABC) + 
N
B P (ABC) + 
N
C P (ABC) = 
= 
B A
A A
q q 1
) CA ( P p

 + 
B A
B B A
q q 1
) CB ( P p q

 + 
B A
C B A C A
q q 1
) CB ( P p q ) CA ( P p


 = 1 
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Remark. The symbols 
N
A P (ABC), 
N
B P (ABC), 
N
C P (ABC) reflect the sub-game (ABC) and strategies 
triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) choosen as well. 
What strategy does Ansis choose? Our intuition predict us that Ansis will try to eliminate the most 
dangerous enemy, namely, the enemy with higher hit probability. That is Basis. In Basis turn purposeful is 
eliminate Ansis. For the weakest shooter Casis purposeful is shot in the air in order the strongest enemies shot 
each other. 
Let us stress that just told mathematically is incorrect. That is typically for game theory: correct are 
solely statements inside the frame of mathematical concepts, any other debate as usually is defective and leads 
to the wrong conclusions. By my opinion directly that creates objective difficulties for the wide applications 
of the game theory in the research of social-economical processes. 
The next lemma has universal character. 
 
Lemma. Conditional Nash equilibrium of the sub-game.  
Let us assume, that 0 < pC < pB < pA ≤ 1; suppose that we have freely chosen some sub-game. Let us 
assume that Casis as strategy leader decides shot in the air. Than situation associated with strategy triple N := 
(A→B; B→A; C→O) is conditional Nash equilibrium. 
 
Let us mark the idea of proof. 
Let us suppose that sub-game is determined by sequence (ABC) and Casis chooses strategy C→O. 
We will prove that situation N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) is the conditional Nash equilibrium of the sub-game 
with corresponding payoffs 
N
A P (ABC), 
N
B P (ABC), 
N
C P (ABC). 
The proof for each sub-game consists from two steps. 
First, we make certain that in the situations S := (A→C; B→A; C→O), T := (A→O; B→A; C→O)  
probability for Ansis to survive decreases to compare with probability 
N
A P (ABC).  
Let us calculate: 
 
S
A P (ABC) = pA PA(BA) + qA 
S
A P (BCA) = pA PA(BA) + qA qB 
S
A P (CAB) = 
= pA PA(BA) + qA qB 
S
A P (ABC), Solving, we get 
S
A P (ABC) = 
B A
A A
q q 1
) BA ( P p

. 
 
Comparing probability 
S
A P (ABC) with probability 
N
A P (ABC) getting before, and taking in acount that  
PA(BA) <  PA(CA), we get 
S
A P (ABC) < 
N
A P (ABC). 
 
Comparing probability 
T
A P (ABC) with probability 
N
A P (ABC) is easier: 
from 
T
A P (ABC) = 
T
A P (BCA) = qB 
T
A P (CAB) = qB 
T
A P (ABC) follows that
T
A P (ABC) = 0. 
 
In the second step we make certain that in the situations U := (A→B; B→C; C→O), V := (A→B; 
B→O; C→O) probability for Basis to survive decreases to compare with probability 
N
B P (ABC). 
 
Let us calculate: 
 
U
B P (ABC) = qA 
U
B P (BCA) = qA pB PB(AB) + qA qB 
U
B P (CAB) = 
= qA pB PB(AB) + qA qB 
U
B P (ABC). Solving, we get 
U
B P (ABC) = 
B A
B B A
q q 1
) AB ( P p q

. 
Comparing probability 
U
B P (ABC) with probability 
N
B P (ABC) getting before, and taking in acount 
that PB(AB) <  PB(CB), we get 
U
B P (ABC) < 
N
B P (ABC). 
We have also 
V
B P (ABC) = qA
V
B P (BCA) = qA
V
B P (ABC), from what follow 
V
B P (ABC) = 0. 
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It may be prooved analogically, that situation associated with strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) 
is conditional Nash equilibrium in other five sub-games. 
 
Consequence. The conditional Nash equilibrium in Martin Shubik game. Let us asume that 0 < pC < 
pB < pA ≤ 1. Let Casis is strategy leader and chooses strategy C→O. Then situation associated with strategy 
triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) is conditional Nash equilibrium in Martin Shubik game. 
 
Although it is not assert in explicit form the content of theme 1.32 "When Weakness Is Strength" in 
Gintis  (2009)  creates  impression,  that  triple  of  strategies  N  =  (A→B;  B→A;  C→O)  determines  Nash 
equilibrium in the each sub-game and in the Martin Shubik game. In the example examined in details this 
statement  is  true.  Multishaped  numerical  experiments  also  signalized  that  this  statement  could  be  true. 
However the aspirations to prove this statement mathematically leads to the conclusion that for some triple of 
probabilities pA, pB, pC situation associated with triple of strategies N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) is not the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Let us examine, for instance, the sub-game (ABC). Taking in account the proof of lemma it would be 
proved that strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) determines the Nash equilibrium in the sub-game (ABC), 
if we were be able to prove that in the situations W := (A→B; B→A; C→A), Y := (A→B; B→A; C→B) the 
payoff of Casis decreases to compare with 
N
C P (ABC). 
It is possible to get the following expression: 
 
W
C P (ABC) = pA PC(CA) + qA
W
C P (BCA) = pA PC(CA) + qA [pB PC(CB) + qB
W
C P (CAB)] = 
= pA PC(CA) + qA pB PC(CB) + qA qB [pC PC(BC) + qC
W
C P (ABC)].  
 
Solving, we get 
W
C P (ABC) = 
C B A
C C B A C B A C A
q q q 1
) BC ( P p q q ) CB ( P p q ) CA ( P p

 
. 
 
Before we have got the expression 
N
C P (ABC) = 
B A
C B A C A
q q 1
) CB ( P p q ) CA ( P p


. 
 
We are interested in investigation of the the set {(pA, pB, pC)} of inequality 
W
C P (ABC) < 
N
C P (ABC) 
solutions and in the set {(pA, pB, pC)} of inequality 
Y
C P (ABC) < 
N
C P (ABC) solutions. The problem arises: how 
to haracterize the sets of solution of inequalities 
W
C P (ABC) < 
N
C P (ABC), 
Y
C P (ABC) < 
N
C P (ABC). 
We are interested also in investigation of the the sets of analogical inequality solutions for the other five sub-
games in order to discover conditions what guarantee that strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) determines 
the Nash equilibrium. 
 
I could not receive explicit algebraic description for these solution sets. However I have received 
empirical  descriptions  of  the  inequality 
W
C P (ABC)  < 
N
C P (ABC), 
Y
C P (ABC)  < 
N
C P (ABC)  solution  sets, 
displayed in the table 1 and in the figure 1. In the table 1 information about minimal value of probability pC 
(depending of values pA, pB) is given; with this probability or bigger probability in the situation, determined 
by strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O), Casis does not refuse the strategy C→O. If, in addition pC < 
min{pA, pB}, then strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) determines the Nash equilibrium of the Martin 
Shubik game. 
In the figure 1 dates of the table 1 are depicted graphically. For each value of probability pA, namely, 
pA = 0,1; pA = 0,2; pA = 0,3; pA = 0,4; pA = 0,5; pA = 0,6; pA = 0,7; pA = 0,8; pA = 0,9, pA = 1 corresponds curve, 
what show connection between probabilities pB, pC, holding value of pA constant. Higher the probability pA, 
higher is dislocated corresponding curve. 
The figure 1 could be considered as empirical solution of the Martin Shubik game. 
 
Table 1. Information about Nash equilibrium conditions in Martin Shubik game. 
pA  pB  min pC  pA  pB  min pC 
0,1  0,02  0,7754  0,6  0,5  0,0431 Jaunzems, A., 2014. Pretension Strategy in the Surviving Game. Expert Journal of Economics, 2(2), pp. 55-68 
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0,1  0,04  0,5041  0,6  0,6  0,0409 
0,1  0,06  0,2501  0,7  0,05  0,9242 
0,1  0,08  0,0561  0,7  0,1  0,8310 
0,1  0,085  0,0326  0,7  0,2  0,5894 
0,1  0,09  0,0227  0,7  0,3  0,2653 
0,2  0,02  0,8954  0,7  0,4  0,0721 
0,2  0,05  0,6973  0,7  0,5  0,0512 
0,2  0,10  0,3309  0,7  0,6  0,0462 
0,2  0,12  0,1925  0,7  0,7  0,0448 
0,2  0,15  0,0483  0,8  0,05  0,9345 
0,2  0,18  0,0257  0,8  0,1  0,8549 
0,2  0,19  0,0237  0,8  0,2  0,6506 
0,3  0,02  0,9325  0,8  0,3  0,3698 
0,3  0,05  0,8073  0,8  0,4  0,1059 
0,3  0,10  0,5596  0,8  0,5  0,0617 
0,3  0,15  0,2874  0,8  0,6  0,0524 
0,3  0,20  0,0673  0,8  0,7  0,0493 
0,3  0,23  0,0385  0,8  0,8  0,0485 
0,3  0,25  0,0328  0,9  0,05  0,9424 
0,3  0,28  0,0289  0,9  0,1  0,8732 
0,4  0,02  0,9503  0,9  0,2  0,6977 
0,4  0,05  0,8600  0,9  0,3  0,4560 
0,4  0,10  0,6804  0,9  0,4  0,1666 
0,4  0,15  0,4695  0,9  0,5  0,0762 
0,4  0,20  0,2407  0,9  0,6  0,0602 
0,4  0,25  0,0714  0,9  0,7  0,0546 
0,4  0,30  0,0413  0,9  0,8  0,0525 
0,4  0,35  0,0347  0,9  0,9  0,0519 
0,5  0,02  0,9608  1  0,05  0,9488 
0,5  0,05  0,8905  1  0,1  0,8876 
0,5  0,1  0,7520  1  0,2  0,7350 
0,5  0,2  0,3959  1  0,3  0,5265 
0,5  0,3  0,0714  1  0,4  0,2516 
0,5  0,4  0,0408  1  0,5  0,0973 
0,6  0,05  0,9103  1  0,6  0,0699 
0,6  0,1  0,7985  1  0,7  0,0610 
0,6  0,2  0,5078  1  0,8  0,0570 
0,6  0,3  0,1501  1  0,9  0,0553 
0,6  0,4  0,0530  1  1  0,0548 
 
The explanation of the table 1 and figure 1. 
For instance, we can read in table 1 and observe visually in figure 1: if  pA = 0,8; pB = 0,4, then for 
each probability pC bigger then 0,1059 Casis shots in the air. Let us remember, that  
in Martin Shubik game Ansis shots Basis and Basis shots Ansis because of pC < pB, pC < pA, namely, Casis is 
the weakest. Therefore, if probability pC satisfates inequality 0,1059 < pC < min{pA, pB} = 0,4, then the strategy 
triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) determines the Martin Shubik games' Nash equilibrium. If pC < 0,1059, then 
strategy triple N = (A→B; B→A; C→O) does not determine the Nash equilibrium because of Casis shots 
Ansis.  
If pC > 0,4, then Casis shots in the air if conditions A→B; B→A fulfil. But Casis is now stronger than 
Basis. What reason in this case is for Ansis to shot Basis? 
 
Another example. We can read in table 1 and observe visually in figure 1: if  pA = 0,5; pB = 0,2, then 
for each probability pC bigger then 0,3959 Casis shots in the air. However with such probability the conditions 
of Martin Shubik game does not fulfil. If probabilities follow in order pB < pC < pA, then in Martin Shubik 
game Ansis shots Casis not Basis, because of Basis is weakest. But just pC < 0,2 immediately Casis shots Jaunzems, A., 2014. Pretension Strategy in the Surviving Game. Expert Journal of Economics, 2(2), pp. 55-68 
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Ansis. Obviously, in the case pA = 0,5; pB = 0,2 such probability pC < min{pA, pB} that strategy triple (A→B; 
B→A; C→O) determines Martin Shubik games' Nash equilibrium does not exist. 
 
In figure 1 especially is depicted the point (pB, pC) = (0,8; 0,5) in order to illustrate the very special 
case (pA, pB, pC) = (1; 0,8; 0,5) examined by Herbert Gintis (2009). Let us mark, that this very special case 
does not expose the complication of surviving game. Our calculations and figure 1 shows: still the probability 
pC satisfies inequalities 0,0570 < pC < 0,8 strategy triple  (A→B; B→A; C→O) determines Nash equilibrium, 
namely, Casis shots in the air. In the same time if, for instance, (pA, pB, pC) = (1; 0,8; 0,05) then Casis shots 
Ansis not in the air. 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical solution of the Martin Shubik game. 
 
3.  Some Conclusions Empirically Proven 
 
3.1. Example "When Weakness Is Strength". 
Let us theoretical examination of matter done before illustrate now with numerical example. 
Let us assume, that pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4. Note, that probabilities satisfies requirements of table 1: pC  = 
0,4 > 0,0602. 
The surviving probabilities of two agents fighting game are showed in table 2. In table 3 the Nash 
situations of the sub-games and situations beside to the Nash equilibrium are exposed. In the table 4 the Nash 
equilibrium of Martin Shubik game is exposed.  
 
Table 2. Surviving probabilities in the two agents game if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4. 
PA(AB)  0,93750  PA(AC)  0,95745 
PA(BA)  0,37500  PA(CA)  0,57447 
       
PB(AB)  0,06250  PB(BC)  0,78947 
PB(BA)  0,62500  PB(CB)  0,47368 
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PC(AC)  0,04255  PC(BC)  0,21053 
PC(CA)  0,42553  PC(CB)  0,52632 
 
Table 3. The Nash equilibriums of the sub-games if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4. 
Sub-game (ABC)  A  B  C  PA(ABC)  PB(ABC)  PC(ABC) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,53856  0,02961  0,43183 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,35156     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00391   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,42820 
Sub-game (ACB)  A  B  C  PA(ACB)  PB(ACB)  PC(ACB) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,53856  0,02961  0,43183 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,351563     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00391   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,42044 
Sub-game (BAC)  A  B  C  PA(BAC)  PB(BAC)  PC(BAC) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21543  0,29605  0,48852 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,14063     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,03906   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,48396 
Sub-game (BCA)  A  B  C  PA(BCA)  PB(BCA)  PC(BCA) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21543  0,29605  0,48852 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,14063     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,03906   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,45224 
Sub-game (CAB)  A  B  C  PA(CAB)  PB(CAB)  PC(CAB) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,53856  0,02961  0,43183 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,35156     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00391   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,34113 
Sub-game (CBA)  A  B  C  PA(CBA)  PB(CBA)  PC(CBA) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21543  0,29605  0,48852 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,14063     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,03906   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,37459 
 
Table 4. The Nash equilibrium of the Martin Shubik game if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4. 
The Martin Shubik game  A  B  C  PA  PB  PC 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,37699  0,16283  0,46018 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,24609     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,02148   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,41676 
 
The examined example allows us to formulate following conclusions.  
1. Strategy triple (A→B, B→A, C→O) in all six sub-games and, of course, also in Martin Shubik 
game leads to the Nash equilibrium. 
2. In the Martin Shubik game in the Nash equilibrium situation the strategy "shot in the air" insures to 
Casis the highest surviving probability comparing other two agents. The weakest shooter has the biggest 
probability to survive! Exactly this result as universal conclusion Gintis (2009) sprightly discuss under the title 
"When Weakness Is Strength". By opinion of Herbert Gintis this result contradicts to the fundamental thesis 
of Charles Darvin "survival of the fittest". 
Below in the example 2.2 "When Weakness Is Not Strength" the case when conclusion of Herbert 
Gintis does not hold is exposed. 
3. Let us observe, that in some sub-games, for instance, in sub-game (ACB) the surviving probability 
of Casis is lower then surviving probability of Ansis. However if Ansis shots Basis and Basis shots Ansis, then 
in the each sub-game Casis shots in the air. 
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3.2. Example "When Weakness Is Not Strength".  
Suppose pA = 0,9; pB = 0,7; pC = 0,2. 
Note, that probabilities satisfies requirements of table 1: pC  = 0,2 > 0,0546. 
The surviving probabilities of two agents fighting game are showed in table 5. In table 6 the Nash 
situations of the sub-games and situations beside to the Nash equilibrium are exposed. In the table 7 the Nash 
equilibrium of Martin Shubik game is exposed.  
 
Table 5. Surviving probabilities in the two agents game if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,7; pC = 0,2. 
PA(AB)  0,92784  PA(AC)  0,97826 
PA(BA)  0,27835  PA(CA)  0,78261 
       
PB(AB)  0,07216  PB(BC)  0,92105 
PB(BA)  0,72165  PB(CB)  0,73684 
       
PC(AC)  0,02174  PC(BC)  0,07895 
PC(CA)  0,21739  PC(CB)  0,26316 
 
Table 6. The Nash equilibriums of the sub-games if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,7; pC = 0,2. 
Sub-game (ABC)  A  B  C  PA(ABC)  PB(ABC)  PC(ABC) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,72613  0,05317  0,22069 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,25826     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00521   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,21982 
Sub-game (ACB)  A  B  C  PA(ACB)  PB(ACB)  PC(ACB) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,72613  0,05317  0,22069 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,258263     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00521   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,21718 
Sub-game (BAC)  A  B  C  PA(BAC)  PB(BAC)  PC(BAC) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21784  0,53174  0,25042 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,07748     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,05208   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,24936 
Sub-game (BCA)  A  B  C  PA(BCA)  PB(BCA)  PC(BCA) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21784  0,53174  0,25042 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,07748     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,05208   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,24170 
Sub-game (CAB)  A  B  C  PA(CAB)  PB(CAB)  PC(CAB) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,72613  0,05317  0,22069 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,25826     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00521   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,19165 
Sub-game (CBA)  A  B  C  PA(CBA)  PB(CBA)  PC(CBA) 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,21784  0,53174  0,25042 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,07748     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,05208   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,21528 
 
Table 7. The Nash equilibrium of the Martin Shubik game if pA = 0,9; pB = 0,7; pC = 0,2. 
The Martin Shubik game  A  B  C  PA  PB  PC 
The Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,47199  0,29246  0,23556 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,16787     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,02864   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,22250 
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1. Strategy triple (A→B, B→A, C→O) in all six sub-games and, of course, also in Martin Shubik 
game leads to the Nash equilibrium. 
2. In the Nash equilibrium situation of the Martin Shubik game surviving probability for Casis is the 
lowest to compare with two others agents. The weakest shooter has the lowest probability to survive! This 
result contradicts to the conclusion of Herbert Gintis (2009, p. 23). 
 
3.3. The example for approving the Nash equilibrium condition. 
Let us suppose, that pA = 0,7; pB = 0,2; pC = 0,1.  
The probabilities satisfies requirements of table 1: pC  = 0,1 < 0,5894. 
The surviving probabilities of two agents fighting game are showed in table 8. Tables 9 and 10 show, 
that strategy triple (A→B, B→A, C→O) does not lead to the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Table 8. Surviving probabilities in the two agents game if pA = 0,7; pB = 0,2; pC = 0,1. 
PA(AB)  0,92105  PA(AC)  0,95890 
PA(BA)  0,73684  PA(CA)  0,86301 
       
PB(AB)  0,07895  PB(BC)  0,71429 
PB(BA)  0,26316  PB(CB)  0,64286 
       
PC(AC)  0,04110  PC(BC)  0,28571 
PC(CA)  0,13699  PC(CB)  0,35714 
 
Table 9. The situations of sub-games. 
Sub-game (ABC)  A  B  C  PA(ABC)  PB(ABC)  PC(ABC) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,79488  0,05075  0,15437 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,67867     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00623   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,15839 
Sub-game (ACB)  A  B  C  PA(ACB)  PB(ACB)  PC(ACB) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,79488  0,05075  0,15437 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,67867     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00623   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,15784 
Sub-game (BAC)  A  B  C  PA(BAC)  PB(BAC)  PC(BAC) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,63590  0,16917  0,19492 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,54294     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,02078   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,19770 
Sub-game (BCA)  A  B  C  PA(BCA)  PB(BCA)  PC(BCA) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,63590  0,16917  0,19492 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,54294     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,02078   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,20833 
Sub-game (CAB)  A  B  C  PA(CAB)  PB(CAB)  PC(CAB) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,79488  0,05075  0,15437 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,67867     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,00623   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,17112 
Sub-game (CBA)  A  B  C  PA(CBA)  PB(CBA)  PC(CBA) 
It is no Nash equilibrium  shot B  shot A  shot air  0,63590  0,16917  0,19492 
  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,54294     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,02078   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,20650 
 
Table 10. The situations of the Martin Shubik game. 
The Martin Shubik game  A  B  C  PA  PB  PC 
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  shot C  shot A  shot air  0,61080     
  shot B  shot C  shot air    0,01350   
  shot B  shot A  shot A      0,18331 
 
The examined example confirms characterization of the Nash equilibrium given into table 1 and in the 
figure 1 and allows to appraise critically the exposition of the theme "When Weakness Is Strength" in Gintis 
(2009). 
 
4.  Survives agent who is not the weakest but pretends to be weakest 
 
As before we suppose that inequality 0 < pC < pB < pA ≤ 1 holds. 
Let us examine surviving game in circumstance when special kind of asymmetric information present. 
  
4.1. Ansis is the strongest but pretends to be weakest. 
Let  us  start  with  case  when  Ansis  pretends  to  be  weakest.  Ansis  assures  Basis  and  Casis  that 
probabilities satisfy the inequality pA < pC < pB and he − Ansis will shot in the air. In the reality Ansis is going 
to shot Basis. 
If Basis and Casis believe that pA < pC < pB and A→O, then, as it was showed before, the strategies of 
Basis and Casis are B→C, C→B, which leads to the illusory conditional Nash equilibrium in the Basis and 
Casis imaginations. In the reality strategy triple (A→B, B→C, C→B) is realized, and that strategy triple 
guaranteed to Ansis the highest surviving probability.  
 
Let us illustrate the case when Ansis is the strongest but pretends to be weakest with help of some 
examples. 
 
Example 1. "When pretence is strenght". 
Let us asume that in reality pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4, but Ansis pretends to be weakest and Basis 
and Casis believe that pA < pC < pB , namely, they believe that Ansis is the weakest and will shot in the air. 
The situations what arise in the six sub-games as result of strategy triple (A→B, B→C, C→B) are exposed in 
the table 11. Situation what arise in the Martin Shubik game is exposed in the table 12. 
 
Table 11. The situations of the sub-games if Ansis pretends to be the weakest. 
Sub-game (ABC)  B  C  A  PB(ABC)  PC(ABC)  PA(ABC) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,03842  0,10115  0,86043 
Sub-game (ACB)  B  C  A  PB(ACB)  PC(ACB)  PA(ACB) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,03842  0,15766  0,80392 
Sub-game (BAC)  B  C  A  PB(BAC)  PC(BAC)  PA(BAC) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,02305  0,11161  0,86533 
Sub-game (BCA)  B  C  A  PB(BCA)  PC(BCA)  PA(BCA) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,00231  0,25288  0,74482 
Sub-game (CAB)  B  C  A  PB(CAB)  PC(CAB)  PA(CAB) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,00384  0,39309  0,60306 
Sub-game (CBA)  B  C  A  PB(CBA)  PC(CBA)  PA(CBA) 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,00231  0,39414  0,60355 
 
Table 12. The situations of the Martin Shubik game if Ansis pretends to be the weakest. 
Martin Shubik game  B  C  A  PB  PC  PA 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,01806  0,23509  0,74685 
 
Let us compare this example with example "When Weakness Is Strength" in the section 2.1.  
We have pA = 0,9; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,4 in both examples. In the tables 2 and 3 are exposed surviving probabilities 
of all agents in case when all players now real proportion. In the tables 11 and 12 are exposed surviving 
probabilities of all agents in case when the strongest player pretends to be weakest, but two other agents do 
not know true. In the first case in the Martin Shubik game PA = 0,38, in the second case PA = 0,75. It is 
advantageous do not expose ones power! Let us note, that in the second case very low surviving probability 
has Basis because of not only Ansis shots to him, but also Casis shots Basis.   
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Example 2. "When pretence is strenght". 
Let us asume that in reality the predominance of Ansis is smaller: pA = 0,7; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,5. 
Ansis pretends to be weakest and Basis and Casis believe that Ansis is the weakest and will shot in the air. The 
situations what arise in the Martin Shubik game as result of strategy triple (A→B, B→C, C→B) are exposed 
in the table 13. Obviously, the pretence of Ansis helps him to survive.  
 
Table 13. The situation of the Martin Shubik game if Ansis pretends to be the weakest. 
Martin Shubik game  B  C  A  PB  PC  PA 
  shot C  shot B  shot B  0,06746  0,28692  0,64562 
 
4.2. The second strongest player Basis pretends to be weakest. 
Now we are going to demonstrate that pretence strategy provides the highest surviving probability 
also for the second strongest player − Basis. 
For instance, let us examine the case, whe in the reality pA = 0,7; pB = 0,6; pC = 0,5. 
Basis pretends to be weakest and Ansis and Casis believe that pA < pC < pB, namely, they believe that Basis is 
the weakest and will shot in the air. The situations what arise as result of strategy triple (A→C, B→A, C→A) 
in the six sub-games are exposed in the table 14. The situation what arises in the Martin Shubik game is 
exposed in the table 15. 
 
Table 14. The situations of the sub-games if Basis pretends to be the weakest. 
Sub-game (ABC)  A  C  B  PA(ABC)  PC(ABC)  PB(ABC) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,23694  0,09973  0,66332 
Sub-game (ACB)  A  C  B  PA(ACB)  PC(ACB)  PB(ACB) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,23694  0,13564  0,62742 
Sub-game (BAC)  A  C  B  PA(BAC)  PC(BAC)  PB(BAC) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,11847  0,19282  0,68871 
Sub-game (BCA)  A  C  B  PA(BCA)  PC(BCA)  PB(BCA) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,04739  0,33245  0,62016 
Sub-game (CAB)  A  C  B  PA(CAB)  PC(CAB)  PB(CAB) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,09478  0,41489  0,49033 
Sub-game (CBA)  A  C  B  PA(CBA)  PC(CBA)  PB(CBA) 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,04739  0,45213  0,50048 
 
Table 15. The situations of the Martin Shubik game if Basis pretends to be the weakest. 
Martin Shubik game  A  C  B  PA  PC  PB 
  shot C  shot A  shot A  0,13032  0,27128  0,59840 
 
Numerical experiments performed show us that the surviving probability which Basis gets do to 
pretending is the largest to compare with another two surviving probabilities. In some sub-games surviving 
probability of pretenders is even larger then pretenders probability to hit.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The author is convinced of cardinal role of game theory in the investigation of individuals’ strategy 
interaction  what  is  fundament  for  understanding  absolutely  all  social  and  economic  processes.  In  the 
circumstance of global confidence crisis the investigation of asymmetric information role in  individuals’ 
interactions seems for us especially actual. In present paper the surviving game of three agents, what essence 
is the competition fight, is investigated. It is established that the shape of Nash equilibrium in a specific way 
depends of surviving probabilities of the agents. In the paper the limitation of some statements of Herbert 
Gintis empirically is proved. By opinion of author, the most valuable result of this research is the solution of 
Martin Shubik surviving game exposed in geometrical form. It is recognized that statement of Martin Shubik 
"survives the weakest" in circumstances of asymmetric information transforms in statement "survives agent 
who is not the weakest but pretends to be weakest". My recommendation is to include the surviving game as 
topic in the game theory course taught in academic program of economics.  
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